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NO. 43 SEPTEMBER 2020 Introduction 
Sustainable Supply Chains in the Agri-
cultural Sector: Adding Value Instead 
of Just Exporting Raw Materials 
Corporate Due Diligence within a Coherent, Overarching and Partnership-based 
EU Strategy 
Bettina Rudloff and Christine Wieck 
The corona pandemic has placed supply chains back on the agenda. The economic 
repercussions spotlight the complexity of today’s global division of labour. Current 
German and European initiatives are seeking to tighten the responsibility of final 
business consumers for human rights and sustainability in their supply chains. The 
objective is to enforce sustainable production in sovereign third countries. In the case 
of agriculture these explicitly supply chain–based approaches need to be backed up 
by improvements in the European Union’s trade, investment and agricultural policies. 
Influencing agricultural supply chains in such a way as to overcome their specific 
sustainability and human rights problems will require all approaches to be combined. 
Currently, conventional approaches treat supply chains in isolation, and only address 
imports flowing into the EU. As such, they consider developing countries exclusively 
in their traditional role as suppliers of raw agricultural commodities and ignore 
options for increasing local value added and fostering development. 
 
Global frameworks like the United Nations 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set 
targets for sustainability in areas including 
production, consumption, agriculture and 
nutrition, working conditions and environ-
mental protections. They promote integrated, 
partnership-driven approaches involving 
multiple actors including corporations. 
The role of the latter sparked political 
interest in the course of major forest fires 
associated with land clearance in Brazil in 
2019. This coincided with the conclusion 
of negotiations for the EU-Mercosur Trade 
Agreement, which – like all EU trade 
agreements today – includes sustainability 
clauses. The enforceability of these pro-
visions is, however, generally limited. Alter-
natives for protecting the rain forest as a 
public good (and addressing climate change) 
without having to rely on the support of 
the Brazilian government were discussed, 
including once again supply chain ap-
proaches. These intervene at the place of 
final consumption of the product whose 
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origination creates sustainability risks. They 
can be established with political support 
in the country of consumption, but the con-
crete effects in far-away sovereign states may 
in fact undermine sustainability efforts. 
These approaches make final business 
consumers responsible for upholding 
human rights and sustainability standards 
along the entire supply chain – which 
involves multiple actors, often in different 
countries and various stages including pri-
mary production, transport, processing and 
distribution, for example. Depending on the 
specifics they may be obligatory or volun-
tary; they require monitoring of risks, search 
for solutions or even liability for violations 
of standards (see Table). The main motiva-
tion for other actors in the supply chain to 
fulfil the respective standards is their eco-
nomic interest in securing sales to major 
markets and final business consumers. 
The supply chains rules currently in use 
differ in their specific sustainability and/or 
human rights goals, sectors addressed, 
incentive structures, measures and level 
of obligation (see Table). Those already in 
place are predominantly voluntary and 
focus more on human rights than sustain-
ability. The United Nations Guiding Prin-
ciples on Business and Human Rights of 
2011 include corporate “due diligence”. The 
OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational Enter-
prises are also voluntary; they reserve griev-
ance mechanisms exclusively for human 
rights violations. The UN Food and Agri-
culture Organisation (FAO) adopts a broader 
approach in its Voluntary Guidelines on 
the Right to Food and Voluntary Guidelines 
on the Responsible Governance of Tenure, 
which address various sustainability objec-
tives as well as human rights. 
Compulsory requirements are rare; in 
the European Union the Regulation on Con-
flict Minerals defines due diligence duties 
requiring business actors to avoid human 
rights violations in this sector; these take 
full effect from 2021. At the level of mem-
ber states only France and the Netherlands 
have mandatory rules, which also cover all 
other sectors (the United Kingdom also has 
such arrangements). Similar provisions are 
under preparation in Belgium, Finland and 
Germany. According to the German coali-
tion agreement, mandatory approaches for 
implementing the aims of the National 
Action Plan for Business and Human Rights 
(NAP) would be considered if the current 
voluntary ones transpire to be inadequate. 
Additionally, the government stressed its 
wish to overcome the existing patchwork 
of different approaches. An inter-minis-
terial paper laying out details of the pro-
posed legislation was expected at the end of 
August, but has been postponed three times 
now after disagreements across the respon-
sible ministries. The points of divergence 
apparently include the size of companies 
to be included, the scope of goals (whether 
to include ecological objectives), the extent 
of liability, and the reach (how far along 
the chain responsibility applies). 
In Germany companies that are already 
implementing the voluntary rules (20 per-
cent according to a survey) fear competitive 
disadvantages if they are not applied across 
the board. Competition effects also speak 
for a pan-European solution of the kind the 
EU Justice Commissioner is proposing for 
2021. This builds on a proposal by the En-
vironment, Oceans and Fisheries Commis-
sioner (which was restricted to the environ-
mental goals of climate and forest protec-
tion in deforestation-free supply chains). 
The European Parliament is currently pre-
paring a proposal for the first plenary 
session in the autumn. It will include sus-
tainability targets as well as human rights 
and cover other sectors alongside agricul-
ture. The German government stressed in 
its coalition agreement that it generally 
supported an EU Action Plan on due dili-
gence, but the scope and type of binding 
remained unclear. 
Given that the EU and Germany are 
major consumers of agricultural products, 
supply chain obligations for businesses 
operating in the Single Market can poten-
tially have a significant effect. They are 
also major agricultural producers, and thus 
appear at both ends of agricultural supply 
chains. This dualism creates opportunities 
to tackle the special challenges of 
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agriculture by introducing export-relevant 
measures to accompany import-focussed 
supply chain rules. 
Specific Features of the 
Agricultural Sector 
Agriculture is the starting point for the new 
EU initiative on deforestation, which de-
pends crucially on developments in this 
sector. It also stands out for the following: 
Short, Concentrated Chains, Small 
Producers, Dual Role for EU 
Short agricultural supply chains involve com-
paratively small numbers of actors, often 
concentrated in just a few countries. They 
are often uni-directional, with developing 
countries exporting unprocessed raw ma-
terials for processing (added value) in devel-
oped countries including the EU. Import 
concentration is also an issue, with the EU 
for example importing 90 percent of its 
Table 
Typical regulation options for sustainability in agricultural supply chains 
Regulation type 
and leverage 
Main addressee 
of obligation/im-
plementation 
Position in 
supply chain 
Target  
dimension 
Economic 
sector 
Usual measures 
Approaches explicitly focused on supply chains 
Due diligence in 
in supply chains 
Business consum-
ers 
End  
= import 
∎ Human rights 
∎ Environment 
All Accountability, search 
for solutions’ with part-
ners, liability 
Deforestation-free 
supply chains 
Business consum-
ers 
End  
= import 
Environment In particular 
agriculture 
Monitoring, certification, 
facilitate market access 
Broader approaches with indirect effects on supply chains 
Agricultural 
policy 
Primary producers Beginning 
and end 
= export and 
import 
Protection of 
agricultural 
resources 
Agriculture Incentives and cost com-
pensation 
Trade policy ∎ Depends on 
goals (e.g. food 
as human right) 
and involved 
businesses  
∎ State 
Beginning 
and end 
= export and 
import 
∎ Human right 
to food 
∎ Labour and 
environmental 
protections  
All  
(special rules 
for agricul-
ture) 
∎ Tariff incentives/trade 
facilitation if imple-
menting sustainability 
∎ Easier access for raw 
materials 
∎ Export restrictions 
and/or tariff protec-
tions in case of supply 
risks 
Investment policy  ∎ State receiving 
investment 
∎ Investing 
enterprise 
Beginning 
and end 
= export and 
import 
Flexible objectives 
in public interest  
All ∎ Easier access for raw 
materials/semi-finished 
products in targeted 
countries 
∎ Exceptions from com-
pensation for indirect 
expropriation 
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cocoa beans from Africa. Animal feed such 
as soybeans represents a large proportion of 
the EU’s unprocessed agricultural imports. 
Conversely, a high proportion of the EU’s 
food exports (40 percent) are processed prod-
ucts with high added value. It tends to be 
easier for final business consumers to en-
force their supply chain obligations where 
short chains are concentrated in just a few 
countries, because fewer actors have to be 
tracked, monitored and disciplined, and 
they are geographically grouped. 
On the other hand, where primary produc-
tion is small-scale, as is the case in developing 
countries, it is harder to implement supply 
chain rules because the company at the end 
of the chain has to shoulder the cost of 
dealing with large numbers of small, often 
spatially dispersed, producers. Small farm-
ers, especially in developing countries, may 
often find it too expensive to fulfil all their 
obligations, or to document their compli-
ance. This may see them squeezed out of 
the market, with consequential loss of in-
come in countries that are already poor. 
The EU’s dual role in supply chains. In regu-
latory approaches explicitly focussing on 
supply chains (as in the current legislative 
proposals) the import side is decisive. Here 
the EU plays a particularly important role 
in products associated with deforestation: 
almost 50 percent of its palm oil comes 
from Indonesia, 25 percent from Malaysia; 
for soybeans the figures are almost 50 per-
cent from the United States and 35 percent 
from Brazil. But the EU also exports signifi-
cant amounts of basic foodstuffs, claiming 
large market shares capable of affecting 
security of supply in importing countries. 
Almost 50 percent of Africa’s total milk 
imports come from the EU, as do 30 per-
cent of its poultry imports. 
Special Sustainability Goals 
In summer 2019 the European Commission 
published a list of deforestation-relevant 
and thus climate-relevant “risk products”. It 
is topped by agricultural and arboricultural 
commodities such as soybeans, beef, palm 
oil, maize, coffee and cocoa. In addition to 
the climate effect, the agricultural sector 
also has specific effects on other dimen-
sions of sustainability and human rights: 
(1) The human right to food. Production and 
consumption of agricultural products are 
intimately bound up with the human right 
to food. The FAO has been developing and 
refining concepts to realise that right for 
more than fifty years. They operate from 
both ends of the agricultural supply chain. 
The FAO assumes that the right to food 
can be realised by domestic production, im-
ports and exports – making it susceptible 
to change through trade, agriculture and in-
vestment policy, among others (see Table). 
At the end of the supply chain – as import-
ers – developing countries often require 
cheap food imports in order to guarantee 
the right to food. But imports can create 
risks if they displace more expensive local 
production: this can negatively affect pro-
ducers’ income and successively weaken 
the domestic agricultural sector. Imports 
often remain the only available option for 
responding rapidly to acute shortages, but 
require sufficient volumes to be available 
at affordable prices on the global markets. 
Supply risks can also arise on the export 
side, typically in connection with flows 
of agricultural commodities from develop-
ing countries to the EU. If the land used to 
grow these export crops expands, the area 
available for domestic consumption shrinks, 
sometimes through expropriation. For ex-
ample the area devoted to palm oil in Indo-
nesia and Malaysia has expanded steadily 
for the past thirty years; this is believed to 
be responsible for one-third of the loss of 
forest. Pressure to intensify production 
can also lead to excessive pesticide usage at 
levels harmful to health and the environ-
ment. These risks to the right to food weigh 
against the benefits of export revenues – 
which can also be used to address supply 
risks by purchasing food. 
(2) Agriculture is the biggest user of child 
labour, accounting for more than 60 percent 
of all known cases; according to the Inter-
national Labour Organisation (ILO) almost 
100 million children are affected. Child 
labour is most prevalent in African agri-
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culture, which also poses the greatest safety 
risks to children in the form of accidents 
and improper use of pesticides. The drivers 
include poverty and lack of parental in-
come. 
EU Leverage to Improve Sustain-
ability and Human Rights in 
Supply Chains 
A study by the EU Commission on due dili-
gence in supply chains published in Febru-
ary 2020 explores various options for regu-
lating supply chains. It emphasises the im-
portance of combining existing approaches 
but restricts itself to those specific to supply 
chains. These should be integrated into 
other policy areas like agriculture, trade 
and investment. This enables the EU to 
promote specific sustainability goals at both 
ends of international supply chains. Here 
the character of supply chains can be radi-
cally transformed rather than merely 
tinkered with. All these approaches need 
to be applied in concert and backed by 
development support. 
Agriculture Policy 
The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
shapes international supply chains via pro-
duction and consumption effects. The cur-
rent reorientation process for the new CAP 
phase – as part of the EU’s new Multi-
annual Financial Framework beginning in 
2021 – should therefore take account of 
risks to sustainability and human rights. 
The “Farm to Fork” strategy recently pro-
posed by the EU Commission for the same 
period as part of the European Green Deal 
is also relevant for the CAP and stresses in 
at least general terms the external signifi-
cance of European supply chains. But con-
crete action to improve their sustainability 
is still lacking. 
Reduce residual risks of export pressure. The 
risk that the CAP traditionally posed to de-
veloping countries originated in artificially 
cheap exports, which were capable of dis-
placing producers in developing countries 
from the global market and even from their 
own domestic markets, potentially increas-
ing poverty, hunger and child labour. Re-
forms to date have sought to decouple sub-
sidies from current production (see SWP 
Comment 21/2018). But the EU member 
states still retain limited scope to apply the 
old coupled payments. In fact they all do 
so, apart from Germany. These production-
stimulating payments should be abolished. 
Prevent risks from climate and import pressure. 
The FAO estimates that livestock farming 
accounts for about 14 percent of global 
greenhouse gas emissions. If certain costs 
are externalised, livestock numbers exceed 
optimal levels. One consequence is direct 
harm to the climate with potential knock-
on effects for the right to food in the form 
of droughts and flooding. These are the main 
global causes of famine alongside armed 
conflict. Another consequence of this politi-
cally driven “excess” livestock farming arises 
throughout the supply chains, for example 
increasing demand for feed in the EU and 
elsewhere. In the EU at least the protein 
component has to be imported in the form 
of soybeans. This makes the EU an attrac-
tive export market offering revenues and 
income as soybean production increases – 
but risks like climate burden due to burn-
ing or expropriation due to changes in land 
use can appear as well. 
One approach currently under discus-
sion in Germany is the animal welfare label. 
Operating via pricing or surcharges, this 
measure would increase the price of meat 
(and thus potentially reduce consumption) 
while compensating farmers for their costs 
and losses. A tax on meat would also be 
conceivable (or in Germany application of 
the full VAT rate), although this would 
require compensating measures if broad 
public acceptance was sought. 
“Sustainability subsidies” can play an inno-
vative role. For example the EU’s long-estab-
lished subsidies for organic farming and 
agri-environmental measures could be ex-
panded to include criteria for sustainable, 
deforestation-free inputs such as animal 
feed. This would allow farmers using cer-
tified sustainable feed to recoup the higher 
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cost. Whether this would represent a “green 
box” measure allowed under the WTO’s 
rules for agricultural subsidies would need 
to be verified, but would be conceivable if it 
was used only to compensate costs without 
an incentive component. This would require 
sound certification criteria of the kind al-
ready being developed for feed and other 
products in the EU Commission’s pilot 
project on product environmental foot-
prints, which also includes land use effects. 
European consumption alone cannot 
solve global problems, not least on account 
of the substitution effects that occur in 
complex international supply chains. For 
example suppliers may seek other markets 
while the sustainability risks remain. Or 
cheaper external meat suppliers could out-
compete their strictly regulated, sustainable 
European rivals in the EU market – but 
without leading to an overall reduction of 
European demand and the associated risks. 
While unilateral intra-European approach-
es can send an important message and serve 
to gather experience, international initia-
tives in the sphere of international trade 
and investment rules are more appropriate. 
Trade and Investment 
In principle counterproductive substitution 
effects can be addressed at the border 
through international trade and investment 
rules, which also protect European products 
against imports of lower standard. Estab-
lished rules offer different degrees of free-
dom and levels of enforcement, and operate 
on both the import and export sides. 
(1) Concretise trade rules protecting the human 
right to food. Article XI of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) permits 
restrictions and even bans on trade in es-
sential products like foodstuffs (in response 
to “critical shortages”) that would otherwise 
be prohibited. Export bans are easily ap-
plied – also in connection with the current 
pandemic – because the criteria and tim-
ing are not defined; they are fundamentally 
inflationary and create supply risks for 
other import-dependent countries. On the 
import side protective tariffs can be applied 
in situations of particular threat, often to 
stimulate domestic production. In bilateral 
agreements the restricted nature of this 
alternative is frequently criticised by the 
economically weaker partner. Few agree-
ments refer explicitly to the right to food 
(one exception being the EU’s economic 
partnership agreement with West Africa). 
This aspect could be strengthened. The pos-
sibility of greater protection against broader 
sustainability risks – for which concrete 
criteria and timing would have to be de-
fined – should also be considered. At the 
same time premature protectionism may be 
counterproductive, because it often makes 
sense to secure supply through cheap im-
ports. 
(2) Full use of the narrow options for tariff 
incentives. In the case of deforestation risk 
commodities, the EU has little leeway to 
encourage observance of sustainability 
criteria by means of tariff reductions. Soy-
beans are already completely tariff-free, for 
example. There is, however, room for tariff 
reductions for palm oil, as well as for all 
highly processed products such as instant 
coffee and chocolate. This could be relevant 
for producer countries that have not to date 
been granted significant tariff preferences 
by the EU, for example in South America, 
and at the same time boost the added value 
that is so central to development and em-
ployment. 
Fundamentally the WTO places tight 
limits on incentives for process require-
ments that do not affect the physical char-
acteristics of the product (and thereby 
define “like” products not permitting dif-
ferential treatment), as is generally the case 
with sustainability and human rights. WTO 
exceptions are, however, available under 
GATT Article XX and could potentially 
apply to the EU’s proposal for a carbon 
(CO2) border tax. 
Bilaterally agreed tariff preferences for 
observance offer greater scope than the 
WTO level. The EU makes use of this option 
vis-à-vis developing countries through its 
expanded Generalised Scheme of Prefer-
ences (GSP plus), which currently benefits 
eight countries that fulfil the ILO’s labour 
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standards and multilateral environmental 
norms. Additional tariff incentives are not 
an issue for the least developed countries 
(LDCs), as they already enjoy completely 
tariff-free access under the Everything but 
Arms (EBA) regime. Here, however, the EU 
Commission can suspend preferences, for 
example in response to grave human rights 
violations – as recently occurred with 
Cambodia. 
Further tariff concessions are also irrele-
vant to most other African countries, which 
enjoy completely tariff-free access through 
the EU’s WPAs. However, strict rules of 
origin sometimes exclude highly processed 
products like chocolate from benefitting 
from tariff exemptions where they contain 
inputs – such as sugar – imported to Af-
rica from third states. A relaxation of rules 
of origin could be considered – compar-
able to conditional tariff preferences under 
GSP plus – to create incentives for employ-
ment and income in high-value, sustainable 
processing. 
(3) Strengthen sustainability standards in 
bilateral agreements. All EU trade agreements 
since 2009 include a sustainability chapter 
with human rights commitments, on the 
basis of ILO labour standards and inter-
nationally agreed environmental norms. 
Unlike EBA, the preferences in these agree-
ments cannot at present be suspended in 
response to human rights violations. There 
is however a dialogue process that triggers 
mediation in the country in which the 
violation occurs, with publicly visible talks 
including the stakeholders. 
The implementation incentive could be 
expanded, but this is often not what the 
EU’s partners want. The right to food could 
also be explicitly included in the chapter 
as a dimension in its own right, or it could 
be incorporated in the sustainability impact 
assessments that are already required for all 
EU agreements. This generally means quan-
titative assessments, which tend to measure 
economic variables and often neglect social 
and ecological effects. 
(4) Utilise the diversity of bilateral partnership 
models. In an equivalency agreement in the 
veterinary sphere, for example, the EU, the 
United States, New Zealand and Canada 
have agreed to mutually recognise each 
other’s food safety standards. The EU al-
ready has thirteen equivalency agreements 
unilaterally recognising various partners’ 
procedures for organic produce as equiva-
lent to its own. Bilateral partnerships for 
timber imports are also proposed under the 
Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and 
Trade programme. 
In all these cases the incentive for the 
other side is to gain easier access to the luc-
rative EU market by facilitating customs 
procedures. These agreements could also 
be expanded to cover other sustainability 
criteria and other products. 
The EU’s import rules for renewable raw 
materials also function on a voluntary basis, 
with a set quota for vehicle fuel, to be filled 
by sustainably produced raw materials, to 
secure demand and guarantee producer 
prices. Palm oil was classified as a problem 
in 2019, because it can be indirectly re-
sponsible for land use changes. As a result 
it will lose its eligibility in 2030 (although 
the main supplier, Indonesia, has lodged a 
complaint with the WTO). One could also 
consider a comparable “sustainable soybean 
quota”, which would require suitable cer-
tification criteria. The animal welfare label 
discussed in Germany includes feed criteria 
that could also be applied to partner coun-
tries’ own imports. 
(5) Alongside these statutory rules, com-
mercial approaches also exist for many de-
forestation risk commodities: For example 
criteria for soybeans and palm oil have been 
drafted in round-table discussions with 
stakeholders, complete with monitoring 
and certification systems. This experience 
should be incorporated into the pending 
German supply chain law, to permit such 
flexible sector-specific approaches to coexist 
with the general solutions. 
(6) Investment rules as part of bilateral invest-
ment treaties (BITs) with sustainability com-
ponents can complement trade-based meas-
ures. They apply to both states and corpo-
rations (see Table), which are both central 
to approaches centring on supply chains, 
and should therefore be used in parallel. 
SWP Comment 43 
September 2020 
8 
Corporations currently are able to claim 
compensation for indirect expropriation 
resulting from political reforms – possibly 
including those designed to improve sus-
tainability. However the more recent of the 
more than 1,500 investor protection agree-
ments involving the EU and its member 
states – for example with Vietnam – offer 
leeway for political reforms in the public 
interest such as environmental and social 
regulation to be exempted from claims for 
indirect expropriation. The older agree-
ments with stricter provisions should there-
fore be modified accordingly. 
Overall Strategy: Flexible Mix and 
Explicit Involvement of Partners 
Agricultural supply chains touch on many 
different dimensions of sustainability and 
specific aspects of human rights. The risks 
involved differ depending on the position-
ing of actors and countries along the supply 
chain. This increases both the need and the 
opportunity to go beyond the classical sup-
ply chain approaches and apply leverage 
from various policy areas. 
The proposed supply chain obligations 
cover instead only the supply side: imports 
into Germany and the EU. Here they cer-
tainly fill a gap, where the attractiveness 
of the EU market and the participation of 
importing businesses opens up possibilities 
to influence supplier regions. Experience 
with voluntary supply chain arrangements 
is valuable, especially in relation to the 
special risks of the agricultural sector. Gen-
erally speaking the commercial approach 
delegates responsibility for sustainability to 
private actors, some of which are geograph-
ically distant from the place of production. 
This leaves them reliant on implementation 
by private actors on the ground and on the 
goodwill of local political actors. 
Therefore the role of various actors – 
including those in the producer regions – 
in the process of hashing out the details 
should be further expanded. Only then can 
the specific difficulties be recognised and 
resolved – for example through develop-
ment measures – to achieve real sustain-
ability. Germany already works through the 
NAP, which is linked to German foreign rep-
resentations in partner countries to ensure 
close contact. Its success should be moni-
tored and coordinated with other member 
states’ local contacts in partner countries. 
The possibilities and limits of new tech-
nologies for supporting traceability in value 
chains (for example blockchain) should be 
assessed. Certain German pilots already 
operating in the agricultural sector can pro-
vide information (spices in Sri Lanka, coffee 
in Rwanda). 
Finally an overall strategy of classical 
and novel approaches for regulating supply 
chains would be flexible enough to respond 
to changes. The direction of supply chains 
is not fixed: Today’s suppliers can become 
tomorrow’s processors at the end of a sup-
ply chain – with greater value added. That, 
not least, should be a development goal for 
developing countries that are currently 
resource exporters. 
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